During the best of times large ticket defense contracts are highly sought after plumbs. They represent high-profile successes that politicians can point to as a great example of taking care of their home state or district. For that reason the political maneuverings engaged to secure a prime contract are often Machiavellian.
Sometimes the most critical aspect is the one that gets the least attention; Is the United States Military getting the best tool available at a reasonable price?
Making the procurement procedure fit the needs of the supplier can and often does have a direct impact on the war fighter.
Case in point?
The DOD requirement for the long-overdue replacement of the Air Forces Tanker Fleet. For the last two years Boeing and a partnership of Northrop Grumman and Airbus-EADS (the European Aeronautical Defense & Space Co.) have battled for the Pentagons $40 billion dollar bid to replace the current tanker fleet a flying gas station for jet fighters so to speak.
February 2008 the Pentagon announces that Northrop Grumman has been chosen to supply tankers built on the Airbus 300 design. Boeing protested the award and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) overturned the decision.
Boeings stipulation was that the terms so favored Northrop Grumman/EADS that the process was far from fair and transparent.
According to noted Defense Policy Analyst at the Lexington Institute Loren Thompson the GAOs findings where so sweeping and definitive" that the Air Force had no choice but to start the competition over.
Now the political firestorm starts this time with the wave beginning overseas.
From President Sarkozy of France to Gordon Brown of the UK all called the decision a blight" on the Obama administration. The deep south gulf States of Alabama and Mississippi have mobilized their Congressional delegations Senators as well as Governors to pressure the DOD into re-considering the specifications for the new tanker. Both states stood to gain thousands of jobs with the aircraft assembly of an EADS-Grumman built plane.
So why did Northrop Grumman drop its bid?
Originally the specifications were custom tailored to the A300 airframe a very large aircraft. Northrop Grumman had long based their marketing strategy on convincing the Air Force that the bigger aircraft was more practical and a better fit Air Force mission parameters.
But does it?
The GAO findings were very straight forward the Northrop Grumman-EADS plane was not cost competitive with Boeings existing 767 Platform.
Boeings Tanker was already being delivered to the Italian and Japanese Air Forces and had won the previous competition prior to Air Force cancellation. According to the Lexington Institutes Loren Thompson Airbus would be more expensive to build and operate even with subsidies".
Looking at the real requirements for a widely deployable tanker with runway specifications similar to the C-17 the Air Force needed a simpler smaller aircraft solution. Seeing the failure of the bigger-is-better strategy Northrop Grumman decided to cut its losses and pull out.
The finger-pointing will no doubt continue but the focus needs to remain clear; the Air Force urgently needs to replace its fleet whose mean aircraft age is 47.
During the best of times large ticket defense contracts are highly sought after plumbs. They represent high-profile successes that politicians can point to as a great example of taking care of their home state or district. For that reason the political maneuverings engaged to secure a prime contract are often Machiavellian.
Sometimes the most critical aspect is the one that gets the least attention; Is the United States Military getting the best tool available at a reasonable price?
Making the procurement procedure fit the needs of the supplier can and often does have a direct impact on the war fighter.
Case in point?
The DOD requirement for the long-overdue replacement of the Air Forces Tanker Fleet. For the last two years Boeing and a partnership of Northrop Grumman and Airbus-EADS (the European Aeronautical Defense & Space Co.) have battled for the Pentagons $40 billion dollar bid to replace the current tanker fleet a flying gas station for jet fighters so to speak.
February 2008 the Pentagon announces that Northrop Grumman has been chosen to supply tankers built on the Airbus 300 design. Boeing protested the award and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) overturned the decision.
Boeings stipulation was that the terms so favored Northrop Grumman/EADS that the process was far from fair and transparent.
According to noted Defense Policy Analyst at the Lexington Institute Loren Thompson the GAOs findings where so sweeping and definitive" that the Air Force had no choice but to start the competition over.
Now the political firestorm starts this time with the wave beginning overseas.
From President Sarkozy of France to Gordon Brown of the UK all called the decision a blight" on the Obama administration. The deep south gulf States of Alabama and Mississippi have mobilized their Congressional delegations Senators as well as Governors to pressure the DOD into re-considering the specifications for the new tanker. Both states stood to gain thousands of jobs with the aircraft assembly of an EADS-Grumman built plane.
So why did Northrop Grumman drop its bid?
Originally the specifications were custom tailored to the A300 airframe a very large aircraft. Northrop Grumman had long based their marketing strategy on convincing the Air Force that the bigger aircraft was more practical and a better fit Air Force mission parameters.
But does it?
The GAO findings were very straight forward the Northrop Grumman-EADS plane was not cost competitive with Boeings existing 767 Platform.
Boeings Tanker was already being delivered to the Italian and Japanese Air Forces and had won the previous competition prior to Air Force cancellation. According to the Lexington Institutes Loren Thompson Airbus would be more expensive to build and operate even with subsidies".
Looking at the real requirements for a widely deployable tanker with runway specifications similar to the C-17 the Air Force needed a simpler smaller aircraft solution. Seeing the failure of the bigger-is-better strategy Northrop Grumman decided to cut its losses and pull out.
The finger-pointing will no doubt continue but the focus needs to remain clear; the Air Force urgently needs to replace its fleet whose mean aircraft age is 47.
